These
moves are said to have formed part of the alleged "Akritas
Plan". This was a plan designed to end the new republic by
quickly suppressing Turkish-Cypriot reactions to `imposed'
constitutional change before outside intervention could be
mounted. Once the essential unitary nature of the state had been
demonstrated to the outside world, and the treaties of guarantee
rendered unnecessary and inoperable, the state would be in a
position, say through plebiscite, to declare enosis [the
annexation of the island to Greece]. Certainly after 1960,
enosis was not dead. Makarios still proclaimed his belief in it,
which, if less sincerely held than hitherto, continued greatly
to alarm the Turkish-Cypriots.
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Archbishop
Makarios |
The proposed
constitutional changes were rejected not just by the Turkish
Cypriots, but also by Turkey. Greece supported Makarios on the
unworkability of the Constitution. The feeling was running high,
the Turkish-Cypriots smelling enosis in the air. An incident
between Greek Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots on 21 December 1963
resulting in the deaths of a Turkish-Cypriot couple, led to the
launching of `a major attack on the Nicosian Turkish-Cypriots,
the first stage in a campaign to settle the problem by force...
The Greek-Cypriots aimed at the subjugation of the Nicosia Turks
by a swift knockout blow, and, in consequence, the automatic
surrender of the Turkish-Cypriot communities in the rest of the
island. The Turkish-Cypriots were largely defenceless, the
Turkish-Cypriot police having been disarmed as a result of a
ruse on the part of the Greek-Cypriot minister' [see
N.Crawshaw's "The Cyprus Revolt", pp 336-7;
P.Oberling's "The Road to Bellapais", pp 87 for more
detail on this]. The incident refereed to above `was followed
immediately by a major Greek-Cypriot attack by the various para-military
forces against the Turks in Nicosia and Larnaca' [see Keith
Kyle's "Cyprus", p10]. During these early stages of
violence that was to continue for the next decade, some 25,000
Turkish-Cypriots became refugees in their own country by fleeing
from their villages to safer areas.
Greek-Cypriot
writers provide a different sort of version of these dire events
which are never forgotten by the Turkish-Cypriots in Northern
Cyprus. [Polyviou,1980, in his "Cyprus Conflict and
Negotiations" writes `an argument broke out, shots were
fired, it is not clear by whom. Given the prevailing atmosphere
of tension it did not take long for serious fighting to engulf
the island', p.34] If all this appalling violence was part of
the Akritas Plan, it did not achieve its objective of crushing
the Turkish-Cypriots at one blow. The situation in Nicosia at
least was calmed down by British troops. Later in a conference
of the guarantor powers in London, Makarios demanded to end the
1960 agreements -since they did not work- and complete
independence, with a unitary government able to amend the 1960
Constitution. The Turkish-Cypriots were offered minority rights,
in accordance with the Greek-Cypriot view that they constituted
a minority, not a community. In view of the violence, the
spirited Turkish-Cypriot response, and Turkish support, not
surprisingly these demands fell of deaf ears. If there was an
Akritas Plan, as seems well attested, it was based on
self-delusion as to the realities of the situation, local, and
international.
Despite the
breakdown of the 1960 Constitution, and its unilateral amendment
by the Greek-Cypriots, in 1964 the UN Security Council
(Resolution 186) referred to the Government of Cyprus in a way
which clearly implied that the government manned only now by the
Greek- Cypriots was the legitimate government of Cyprus. It was
important of course, not to condone partition, but the
subsequent recognition by all states, save Turkey, of the
Greek-Cypriots as `the legitimate' government of all the island
is deeply resented in Northern Cyprus, where it has had serious
economic and other effects. For many states with minorities, the
Treatment of the Turkish-Cypriots as an equal community created
a dangerous precedent and many member states of the United
Nations Assembly had minorities.
 In
February 1964 Britain was relieved that a UN force was to be
established to help maintain, or secure, peace in Cyprus. The
British troops manning the Green Line set up to divide Greek
from Turkish Nicosia would then be able to be withdrawn or
operate under a UN flag. However, violence continued without
interruption, and ominously some 20,000 mainland Greek troops
entered the island illegally, as too, a little later in June
1964, did Grivas, now active again. In August 1964 he attacked
the Turkish-Cypriot area of Kokkina (Erenkoy). This major attack
might well have succeeded but for air attacks launched against
his troops by the Turkish air force. There was a danger of war
between Turkey and Greece, but there was little that Greece
could do militarily. A cease-fire was accepted. The Turkish
response had been effective and to some extent mitigated the
chagrin earlier induced by the blunt letter from President
Lyndon Johnson of US to Ismet Inonu, the Turkish Prime Minister
at the time, warning Turkey of the consequences. If Turkey
invaded Cyprus, as intended in May 1964. This had been in
response to a build-up of Greek strength on the island and the
continuing ill treatment of the Turkish-Cypriots, which now
included economically devastating blockades of their areas.
After 1964
Cyprus continued in a disrupted state but the Akritas plan had
failed. Two outside attempts at a solution also failed. The
first, the Acheson Plan, after the former American Secretary of
State, Dean Acheason, provided for self-administration by the
Turkish-Cypriots and for a Turkish base on the island. To the
Greek side this looked like a partition, and Turkey would not
only accept a permanent base, not a leased one. A Plan proposed
by the UN mediator Galo Plaza, was rejected by the Turkish side
since it rejected federation.
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Between 1963-1974 Turkish-Cypriots were forced to live in
small ghettos in Cyprus shown in red on the map
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Between 1964 and 1967 the
situation on the ground improved somewhat, mainly because the Turkish-Cypriots
had largely withdrawn and consolidated within their own areas, including Nicosia
where they were ruled by the Provisional Government they established in 1967 to
replace an ad hoc general committee.
The UN also helped to reduce
blockades and, here and there, to heal relations. Then, in April 1967 the
situation deteriorated when a military junta seized power in Greece and
determined to do something effective about the Cyprus situation. Unable to
achieve an agreement with Turkey the junta prompted more decisive action in
Cyprus for enosis, but increasingly ran into opposition of Makarios, who was
becoming disenchanted with the Greek connection, especially of liaison with the
Greek junta.
In November 1967 Grivas,
seizing the initiative, led a planned attack on two Turkish-Cypriot villages in
the south of the island (Kophinou and Ayios Theodhoros) fearing apparently, on
the best construction, that the Turks might be seeking from these defended areas
to control the Nicosia-Limassol road. The villages were overrun with many
casualties. Turkey threatened air strikes. The Greek forces withdrew after
serious casualties had been suffered by the Turkish-Cypriots. In Turkey, under
pressure of public opinion, the Turkish government (under Süleyman Demirel)
demanded that Greece should forthwith withdraw her troops from Cyprus. Greece
refused. Serious preparations for war were made by Turkey.
President Johnson sent Cyrus
Vance to act as intermediary. Turkey refused a staged withdrawal, but accepted
an `accelerated' withdrawal and the immediate return of Grivas to Greece. At
home the Demirel government was accused of feebleness in not taking a firmer
action, but it was a considerable Turkish victory, and finally disabused
Makarios of any hopes of effective Greek military support.
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