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| AKRITAS
PLAN |
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TOP SECRET HEADQUARTERS |
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Recent public statements by Archbishop Makarios have shown the course
which our national problem will take in near future. As we have stressed
in the past, national struggles cannot be concluded overnight; nor is it
possible to fix definite chronological limits for the conclusion of the
various stages of development in national causes. Our national problem
must be viewed in the light of developments which take place and conditions
that arise from time to time, and measures to be taken, as well as their
implementation and timing, must be in keeping with the internal and external
political conditions. The whole process is difficult and must go through
various stages because factors which will affect the final conclusion are
numerous and different. It is sufficient for everyone to know, however,
that every step taken constitutes the result of a study and that at the
same time it forms the basis of future measures. Also, it is sufficient
to know that every measure now contemplated is a first step and only constitutes
a stage towards the final and unalterable national objective which is the
full and unconditional application of the right of self-determination.
As the final objective remains unchanged, what must be dwelt upon is the
method to be employed towards attaining that objective. This must, of necessity,
be divided into internal and external (international) tactics because the
methods of the presentation and handling of our cause within and outside
the country are different. |
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| A.
METHOD TO BE USED OUTSIDE |
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In the closing stages of the (EOKA) struggle, the Cyprus problem
had been presented to the world public opinion and to diplomatic circles
as a demand of the people of Cyprus to exercise the right of self-determination.
But the question of Turkish minority had been introduced in circumstances
that are known, inter-communal clashes had taken place and it had been
tried to make it accepted that it was impossible for the two communities
to live together under a united administration. Finally the problem was
solved, in the eyes of many international circles, by the London and Zurich
Agreements, which were shown as solving the problem following negotiations
and agreements between the contending parties.
(a) Consequently our first aim has been
to create the impression in the international field that the Cyprus problem
has not been solved and that it has to be reviewed.
(b) The creation of the following impressions
has been accepted as the primary objective:
(i) that the solution which has been
found is not satisfactory and just
(ii) that the agreement which has been
reached is not the result of the free will of the contending parties.
(iii) that the demand for the revision
for the agreements is not because of any desire on the part of the Greeks
to dishonor their signature, but an imperative necessity of survival of
them.
(iv) that the co-existence of the two
communities is possible, and
(v) that the Greek majority, and not
the Turks, constitute the strong elements on which foreigners must rely.
(c) Although it was most difficult to
attain the above objectives, satisfactory results have been achieved. Many
diplomatic missions have already come to believe strongly that the Agreements
are neither just nor satisfactory, that they were signed as a result of
pressures and intimidations without real negotiations, and that they were
imposed after many threats. It has been an important trump in our hands
that the solution brought by the Agreements was not submitted to the approval
of the people; acting wisely in this respect, our leadership avoided holding
a referandum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely approved the
Agreements in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959. Generally speaking,
it has been shown that so far the adminis- tration of Cyprus has been carried
out by the Greeks and that the Turks played only a negative part acting
as a brake.
(d) Having completed the first stage
of our activities and objectives we must materialize the second stage on
an international level. Our objective in this second stage is to show:
(i) that the aim of the Greeks is not
to oppress the Turks but only to remove unreasonable and unjust provisions
of the administrative mechanism;
(ii) that it is necessary to remove
these provisions right away because tomorrow may be too late;
(iii) Omitted
(iv) that this question of revision
is a domestic issue for Cypriots and does not therefore give the right
of intervention to anyone by force or otherwise;
(v) that the proposed amendments are
reasonable and just and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.
(e) Generally speaking, it is obvious
that today the international opinion is against any form of oppression,
and especially against oppresion of minorities. The Turks have so far been
able to convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus with Greece
will amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances we stand a
good chance of success in influencing world public opinion if we base our
struggle not on ENOSIS but on self-
determination. But in order to be able to exercise the right of self-determination
fully and without hindrance, we must first get rid of the Agreements (e.g.
the Treaty of Gurantee, the Treaty of Alliance etc) and of those provisions
in the Constitution which will inhibit the free and unbridled expression
of the will of people and which they carry dangers of external intervention.
For this reason, our first target has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which
is the first Agreement to be cited as not being recognized by the Greek
Cypriots.
When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed no legal or moral force will
remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a plebiscite.
It will be understood from the above explanations that it is necessary
to follow a chain of efforts and developments in order to ensure the success
of our Plan. If these efforts and developments failed to materialize, our
future actions would be legally unjustified and politically unattainable
and we would be exposing Cyprus and its people to grave consequences. Actions
to be taken are as follows:
(a) The amendment of the negative elements
of the Agreements and the consequent de facto nullification of the Treaties
of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is essential because the necessity
of amending the negative aspects of any Agreement is generally acceptable
internationally and is considered reasonable (passage omitted) whereas
an external intervention to prevent the amendment of such negative provisions
is held unjustified and inapplicable.
(b) Once this is achieved the Treaty
of Guarantee (the right of intervention) will become legally and substantially
inapplicable.
(c) Once those provisions of the Treaties
of Guarantee and Alliance which restrict the exercise of the right of self-determination
are removed, the people of Cyprus will be able, freely, to express and
apply its will.
(d) It will be possible for the Force
of the State (the Police Force) and in addition, friendly military Forces,
to resist legitimately any intervention internally or from outside, because
we will then be completely independent.
It will be seen that it is necessary for actions from
(a)
to (d) to be carried out in the order indicated.
It is consequently evident that if we ever hope to have any chance
of success in the international field, we cannot and should not reveal
or proclaim any stage of the struggle before the previous stage is completed.
For instance, it is accepted that the above four stages constitute the
necessary course to be taken, then it is obvious that it would be senseless
for us to speak of amendment (a) if stage (d) is revealed, because it would then be
rediculous for us to seek the amendment of the negative points with the
excuse that these amendments are necessary for the functioning of the State
and of the Agreements.
The above are the points regarding our targets and aims, and the
procedure to be followed in the international field.
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| B.
THE INTERNAL ASPECT |
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Our activities in the internal field will be regulated according
to their repercussions and to interpretations to be given to them in the
world and according to the effect of our actions on our national cause.
1. The only danger
that can be described as insurmountable is the possibility of a forceful
intervention. This danger, which could be met partly or wholly by our forces
is important because of the political damage that it could do rather than
the material losses that it could entail. If intervention took place before
stage (c), then such intervention would be
legally tenable at least, if not entirely justifiable. This would be very
much against us both internationally and at the United Nations. The history
of many similar incidents in recent times shows us that in no case of intervention,
even if legally excusable, has the attacker been removed by either the
United Nations or the other powers without significant concessions to the
detriment of the attacked party. Even in the case of the attack on Suez
Canal by Israel, which was condemned by almost all members of the United
Nations and for which Russia threatened intervention, the Israelis were
removed but, as a concession, they continued to keep the port of Eliat
in the Red Sea. There are, however, more serious dangers in the case of
Cyprus.
If we do our work well and justify the attempt we shall make under
stage (a) above, we will see, on the one hand, that intervention will not
be justified and, on the other hand, we will have every support since,
by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take place before negotiations
take place between the Guarantor Powers, that is, Britain, Greece, and
Turkey. It is at this stage, i.e. at the stage of contacts (before intervention)
that we shall need international support. We shall obtain this support
if the amendments proposed by us seem reasonable and justified. Therefore,
we have to be extremely careful in selecting the amendments that we shall
propose.
The first step, therefore, would be to get rid of intervention by
proposing amendments in the first stage. Tactic to be followed: (Omitted)
2. It is evident
that for intervention to be justified there must be a more serious reason
and a more immediate danger than simple Constitutional amendments. Such
reasons can be:
(a) The declaration of ENOSIS before
actions (a) to (c)
(b) Serious intercommunal unrest which
may be shown as a massacre of Turks.
The first reason is removed as a result of the Plan drawn up for
the first stage and consequently what remains, is the danger of intercommunal
strife. We do not intend to engage, without provocation, in massacre or
attack against the Turks. Therefore, (section omitted) the Turks can react
strongly and incite incidents and strife, or falsely stage massacres, clashes
or bomb explosions in order to create the impression that the Greeks attacked
the Turks and that intervention is imperative for their protection. Tactic
to be employed: Our actions for amending the Constitution will not be secret;
we would always appear to be ready for peaceful talks and our actions would
not take any provocative and violent form. Any incidents that may take
place will be met, at the beginning, in a legal fashion by the legal Security
Forces, according to a plan. Our actions will have a legal form.
3. (Omitted)
4. It is, however,
naive to believe that it is impossible for us to proceed to substantial
actions for amending the Constitution, as a first step towards our more
general Plan as described above, without expecting the Turks to create
or stage incidents and clashes. For this reason, the existence and the
strengthening of our Organization is imperative because:
(a) if, in case of spontaneous resistance
by the Turks, our counter attack is not immediate, we run the risk of having
a panic created among the Greeks, in towns particular. We will then be
in danger of losing vast areas of vital importance to the Turks, while
if we show our strength to the Turks immediately and forcefully, then they
will probably be brought to their senses and restrict their activities
to insignificant, isolated incidents.
(b) In case of a planned or unplanned
attack by the Turks, whether this be staged or not it is necessary to suppress
this forcefully in the shortest possible time, since, if we manage to become
masters of the situation within a day or two, outside intervention would
not be possible, probable or justifiable.
(c) The forceful and decisive suppressing
of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for
further Constitutional amendments, and it should then be possible to apply
these without the Turks being able to show any reaction. Because they will
learn that it is impossible for them to show any reaction without serious
consequences for their Community.
(d) In case of the clashes becoming
widespread, we must be ready to proceed immediately through actions (a)
to (d), including the immediate declaration
of ENOSIS, because, then, there will be no need to wait or to engage in
diplomatic activity.
5. In all these
stages we must not overlook the factor of enlightening, and of facing the
propaganda of those who do not know or cannot be expected to know our plans,
as well as of the reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle
must go through at least four stages and that we are obliged not to reveal
our plans and intentions prematurely. It is therefore more than a national
duty for everyone to observe full secrecy in the matter. Secrecy is vitally
essential for our success and survival. This, however, does not prevent
the reactionaries and irresponsible demagogues from indulging in false
patriotic manifestations and provocations. Our Plan would provide them
with the possibility of putting forward accusations to the effect that
the aims of our leadership are not national and that only the amendment
of the Constitution is envisaged. The need for carrying out Constitutional
amendments in stages and in accordance with the prevailing conditions,
makes our job even more difficult. All this must not, however, be allowed
to drag us to irresponsible demagogy, street politics and a race of nationalism.
Our deeds will be our undeniable justification. In any case owing to the
fact that, for well-known reasons, the above Plan must have been carried
out and borne fruit long before the next elections, we must distinguish
ourselves with self-restraint and moderation in the short time that we
have. Parallel with this, we should not only maintain but reinforce the
present unity and discipline of our patriotic forces. We can succeed in
this only by properly enlightening our members so that they in turn enlighten
the public.
Before anything else we must expose the true identity of the reactionaries.
These are petty and irresponsible demagogues and opportunists. Their recent
history shows this. They are unsuccessful, negative and antiprogressive
elements who attack our leadership like mad dogs but who are unable to
put forward any substantive and practical solution of their own. In order
to succeed in all our activities we need a strong and stable government,
up to the last minute. They are known as clamorous slogan-creators who
are good for nothing but speech-making. When it comes to taking definite
actions or making sacrifices they are soon shown to be unwilling weaklings.
A typical example of this is that even at the present stage they have no
better proposal to make than to suggest that we should have recourse to
the United Nations. It is therefore necessary that they should be isolated
and kept at a distance.
We must enlighten our members about our plans and objectives
ONLY
VERBALLY. Meetings must be held at the sub-headquarters of the Organization
to enlighten leaders and members so that they are properly equipped to
enlighten others. NO WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF ANY
SORT IS ALLOWED. LOSS OR LEAKAGE OF ANY DOCUMENT PERTAINING TO THE ABOVE
IS EQUIVALENT TO HIGH TREASON. There can be no action that would
inflict a heavier blow to our struggle than any revealing of the contents
of the present document or the publication of this by the opposition.
Outside the verbal enlightenment of our members, all our activities,
and our publications in the press in particular, must be most restrained
and must not divulge any of the above. Only responsible persons will be
allowed to make public speeches and statements and will refer to this Plan
only generally under their personal responsibility and under the personal
responsibilty of the Chief of sub-headquarters concerned. Also, any reference
to the written Plan should be done only after the formal approval of the
Chief of the sub-headquarters who will control the speech or statement.
But in any case such speech or statement MUST
NEVER BE ALLOWED TO APPEAR IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER PUBLICATION.
The tactic to be followed: Great effort must be made to enlighten
our members and the public VERBALLY. Every
effort must be made to show ourselves as moderates. Any reference to our
plans in writing, or any reference in the press or in any document is strictly
prohibited. Responsible officials and other responsible persons will continue
to enlighten the public and to increase its morale and fighting spirit
without ever divulging any of our plans through the press or otherwise.
NOTE: The present document should
be destroyed by burning under the personal responsibilities of the Chief
of the sub-headquarters and in the presence of all members of the staff
within 10 days of its being received. It is strictly prohibited to make
copies of the whole or any part of this document. Staff members of sub-headquarters
may have it in their possession only under the personal responsibility
of the Chief of sub-headquarters, but in no case is anyone allowed to take
it out of the office of sub-headquarters.
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Cyprus
History |
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