1. The President in office of the Council of Ministers has been
sent three applications, dated 3 July 1990, by a body calling
itself "the Government of the Republic of Cyprus" seeking
membership for "Cyprus" (not "the Republic of Cyprus")
in the three European Communities. In this connection, the Turkish
Cypriot Side respectfully requests the Council of Ministers to
take into consideration the following objections and observations.
Cyprus is a two-community island.
2. The basis of the Turkish Cypriot opposition to the present
application is that the Republic of Cyprus as originally conceived
and brought into being in 1960 was founded on the existence of
two separate and politically equal communities-one Turkish, the
other Greek. Whatever may have happened since then-and the essential
elements will be recalled below-the fact remains that there are
still two separate communities in Cyprus and a legal background
which recognises the separateness and political equality of these
two communities. Even if the Greek Cypriot community has in a
number of contexts succeeded in assuming the mantle of "the
Republic of Cyprus", that is not a consideration that can
now entitle it to represent the whole of Cyprus in so fundamental
a development as the acquisition of membership of the European
Communities or at all.
Membership of the ECs is unworkable in a divided island.
3. Unlike any other international relationship into which the
Greek Cypriot community has purported to enter-albeit illegally-in
the name of "the Republic of Cyprus", membership of
the European Communities would involve a degree of participation
by the Communities in the life of their Members which is quite
unworkable in the circumstances presently prevailing in Cyprus
and pending a mutually acceptable comprehensive settlement in
the form of a bi-communal, bi-zonal, federal republic. The European
Communities cannot have, and should not consider having, as a
single member, an island which is divided into two parts, each
separately governed and divided by a firm boundary, when membership
demands, among other things, free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital, not to mention the application of common
policies on such important matters as agriculture, fisheries and
transport throughout the territories of the Members of the Communities.
The application is misconceived.
4. The applicant, in submitting an application in respect of "Cyprus"
(not, it should be noted, "the Republic of Cyprus")
suggests a unity of the island which is not supportable either
in law or in fact. It will be useful to recall the essential elements
in the situation. They are, regrettably, too often overlooked.
Early recognition of the two-community nature of Cyprus.
5. There are two different peoples in Cyprus. This historical
fact was underlined by the British Government during the period
when Cyprus was approaching independence. The British Colonial
Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said on 19 December 1956: "...
it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that
any exercise of self determination should be effected in such
a manner that the Turkish
Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall,
in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide
for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's
Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in
such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual
options". This statement was confirmed by the Prime Minister,
Mr. Macmillan, on 26 June 1958, who described these assurances
as "pledges".
Bi-communal essentials of the 1960 settlement.
6. Despite the reference to "partition" as an option,
in answer to Greek Cypriot claims for union of Cyprus with Greece,
this was not the solution eventually adopted. Instead, a compromise
was reached along the lines of a bi-communal State, in which the
respective legal and political positions of the two communities
were carefully regulated. Absolutely fundamental to the division
of power between the two communities was the idea that Cyprus
could not be ruled by one community to the exclusion of the other.
Both communities had to participate as partners in all decision
making and in the administration of the island. Equally fundamental
was the idea that the greater numbers of the Greek Cypriot community
could not be used to impose unacceptable policies or decisions
upon the Turkish Cypriot community. Adequate checks and balances
were provided in the constitution for the preservation of the
national identity and partnership status of each community.
International and constitutional nature of the 1960 settlement.
7. These fundamentals were incorporated in what has come to be
called "the 1960 settlement". It is characterised by
the fact that it is both an international and a constitutional
settlement. Thus the subsequent conduct of the Greek Cypriot community
has to be judged not only in terms of constitutional law but also
of international law.
Strict division of power between the two communities.
8. The 1960 settlement consisted, first, of the Zurich and London
Agreements of 1959. These were international treaties which raised
to the level of international legal obligation the undertakings
given by the parties. Thus, the Zurich Agreement, concluded between
the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers on 11 February 1959, established
the Basic structure of the emergent Republic of Cyprus. It provided,
as basic articles for inclusion in the Cyprus Constitution, a
clear and balanced division of power between the Greek and Turkish
Cypriot communities, including provision for a Greek Cypriot President,
elected solely by Greek Cypriots, and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President,
elected solely by Turkish Cypriots, and seventy percent-thirty
percent distribution of seats in the Council of Ministers and
the legislature, as well as the same allocation of places in the
administration. Also, the President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President
were granted veto powers which would have enabled them to block
measures prejudicial to their respective communities. Executive
power "ensued from the President and Vice President acting
conjointly". Another essential feature of the basic articles
was the specific exclusion of the total or partial union of Cyprus
with any other State.
International guarantee of the Settlement
9. The undertakings given in these Agreements were reinforced
by the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, as well as by incorporation
in the Cyprus Constitution itself. The parties to these treaties
were the Republic of Cyprus, on whose behalf "the Greek Cypriot
President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President" signed,
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. These treaties created
for the parties rights and duties under international law. In
the Treaty of Guarantee especially the Republic of Cyprus undertook
to ensure respect for its constitution, while Greece, Turkey and
the United Kingdom, taking note of this undertaking, recognised
and guaranteed the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles
of the Constitution. This Treaty also expressly provided that
"in so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible,
each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserved the right to take
action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs
established by the present Treaty."
Early Greek Cypriot rejection of Turkish Cypriot participation.
10. Within three years of the conclusion of these solemn compacts
the Greek Cypriots had embarked upon a deliberate course of subverting
the basic articles. This culminated in the resignation of the
neutral President of the Constitutional Court and the eventual
denial of each and every right given to Turkish Cypriots under
the Constitution. in pursuance of the so-called "Akritas
Plan" that was aimed at uniting the island with Greece, the
Turkish Cypriots were ousted from their guaranteed positions in
the organs of government, the political equality and the vested
rights of the Turkish Cypriots were denied, while the Greek Cypriot
members of the House of Representatives enacted, in flagrant violation
of the 1960 settlement and the basic articles of the Constitution,
legislation providing for the operation of various organs of government
without Turkish Cypriot participation. In June 1967 the Greek
Cypriot legislature went so far as unanimously to pass a resolution
in favour of "enosis", union with Greece, so clearly
prohibited by Article 185 of the Constitution.
Separation of the Turkish Cypriot community.
11. Since December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot community, faced
by discrimination, threats and physical attacks was, for its self
preservation, compelled gradually to withdraw into self-administering
enclaves, cut off from public services and unassisted by public
monies. The fact of administrative and territorial division between
the communities was acknowledged eleven years later by the Foreign
Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom in the Declaration
of 30 July 1974, which "noted the existence in practice in
the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that
of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot
community. "It is further attested by the maintenance of
a dividing line across the island by UNFICYP, which had arrived
in Cyprus with the consent of both sides in March 1964 as a result
of the break up of the partnership state and its administration.
In due course, in 1975, the Turkish Cypriot administration which
had been administering Turkish Cypriots since the breakdown of
the legitimate partnership government, developed into the Turkish
Federated State of Cyprus, by way of adaptation to the circumstances,
and for the purpose of creating the federated Turkish Cypriot
wing of a future federal republic of Cyprus, thus re-establishing
the defunct partnership state in a federal form.
Constitutional illegitimacy of Greek Cypriot action acknowledged.
12. The lack of constitutional foundation for the Greek Cypriot
administration was acknowledged by the Foreign Ministers of Greece,
Turkey and the United Kingdom in a Declaration of 30 July 1974
when they recorded that "among the constitutional questions
to be discussed should be that of an immediate return to constitutional
legitimacy, the Vice-President assuming the functions provided
for under the 1960 Constitution." Such words could not have
been used if the prevailing condition at the time had been one
of adherence to the Constitution. In fact Makarios had openly
declared the 1960 Agreements and the Constitution to be "dead
and buried", and he offered Turkish Cypriots minority rights
in what he regarded a Greek Cypriot state. Here was a plain recognition,
therefore, that there was not a legitimate government representing
the whole population. And the reference to the need for the Vice-President
to assume the functions provided for under the 1960 Constitution,
coupled with the well-known fact that the Vice-President had been
Turkish and had not voluntarily renounced the exercise of his
functions, indicates appreciation that he had been unlawfully
excluded from his office-an exclusion which in constitutional
terms means-inter alia-that the Turkish Cypriot community was
deprived of its right under Article 57 of the Constitution to
veto decisions relating to foreign affairs (or, conversely, to
approve such decisions by deliberately acquiescing in them) and
the collapse of the partnership state.
1974 - `Enosis' thwarted by quarantor action of Turkey.
13. Prior to this, however, certain Greek and Greek Cypriot elements
had carried a stage further their repudiation of the prohibition
of "enosis". For the purpose of bringing about immediate
`Enosis', in July 1974 a Greek-inspired and militarily supported
coup took place against Archbishop Makarios, who himself had previously
maintained that by destroying the constitutional order he had
brought Cyprus to the "nearest point to enosis". In
the exercise of its rights and duties as a guarantor of the 1960
settlement and upon the urgent plea of the Turkish Cypriot side
for help, Turkey landed forces in Cyprus in order to safeguard
the Turkish Cypriot population and prevent a takeover of the island
by Greece. They freed the northern part of the island from Greek
and Greek Cypriot forces, which Makarios had described to the
Security Council on 19 July 1974 as "forces of invasion from
Greece", and made it a haven for the whole Turkish Cypriot
population including those stranded in the enclaves in the south-a
process which was completed by the 1975 Agreement on the Voluntary
Regrouping of Populations. There now coexist on the island two
separate administrations-the Greek Cypriot administration in the
South which has assumed the role of "the Republic of Cyprus"
and the Turkish Cypriot administration which has established itself
as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in view of the refusal
of the Greek Cypriot side to agree to share power with the Turkish
Cypriots on the basis of equality as envisaged in the 1977 and
1979 High Level Agreements.
Greek Cypriots not the lawful government of Cyprus.
14. In the circumstances set out above, it will be readily understood
why the Turkish Cypriots regard as unlawful the assumption by
the Greek Cypriots of the role of "the Republic of Cyprus".
That Republic was as ordained and in the image of the 1960 settlement.
The Greek Cypriots overthrew that settlement in December 1963.
Yet they appear to have been accepted internationally as the appropriate
representatives of Cyprus. This cannot be right, legally or morally,
and no one should be surprised by the view that the Turkish Cypriots
take of the situation.
International illegality of Greek Cypriot action.
15. The Turkish Cypriots believe that the unilateral application
by the Greek Cypriots to join the Communities is an international
act of an entirely different order of intensity and significance
to anything that has come before. The Council of Ministers of
the European Communities may not lawfully disregard the illegality
of the position and conduct of the Greek Cypriot regime in Cyprus
when the latter purports to present itself as the "government
of the Republic of Cyprus." The objection now raised by the
TRNC on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot people to the validity of
the application rests upon the lack of entitlement of the Greek
Cypriot community to make the application in the name of "Cyprus"
or, indeed, of "the Republic of Cyprus." This objection
rests only indirectly upon the constitutional illegitimacy of
the Greek Cypriot regime for it is possible to conceive of cases
in which merely constitutional illegitimacy would not preclude
a regime from seeking admission to an international organisation
on behalf of a State. However, where, as in this case, the constitutional
illegitimacy occasions an international illegitimacy, the position
is quite different and cannot be ignored by the European Communities.
Moreover, in the case of Cyprus where the bi-communality of the
state and its government was the precondition for legitimacy,
this unilateral act by Greek Cypriots is a clear and unacceptable
action to impose their political will on the Turkish Cypriots
on a matter which will affect generations to come.
Greek Cypriot application violates international and constitutional
ban on Enosis.
16. The application is also open to objection on the ground, arising
from Article 1 of the Treat of Guarantee, and echoed in Article
185 of the Constitution, that the Republic of Cyprus has undertaken
"not to participate in whole or in part, in any political
or economic union with any State whatsoever." This limitation
is broad enough to prohibit the link with Greece that a membership
initiated and negotiated by the Greek Cypriots alone would bring
about, even within the framework of the European Communities.
Comparison with Germany is false.
17. Greek Cypriot awareness of the vulnerability of the application
is suggested by the following report in the press (see The Wall
Street Journal, 5 July 1990) that Mr. Iacovou, the Foreign Minister
of the Greek Cypriot regime, said:
"the island's political situation shouldn't have an effect
on his country's membership application. He drew an analogy with
Germany, saying that the division of that country into East and
West had never been viewed as a barrier to EC membership."
The "analogy" is quite false and reveals precisely the
weakness of the Greek Cypriot application. When the Federal Republic
of Germany became an original member of the European Communities,
no claim was made by it that the territorial scope of its membership
extended beyond the area under its actual control. It did not
claim to represent East Germany for purposes of becoming a member.
It is indeed significant that the only territorial matters raised
by the FRG related to the position of Land Berlin and the Saar.
In the present situation, however, it is evident that the Greek
Cypriots do not seek to limit their application in a comparable
manner.
Application is a nullity. No action should be taken on it.
18. The present opposition to the Greek Cypriot applications is
of a fundamental nature. It arises in limine. The internationally
unlawful character of the authority that purports to make the
application deprives it of the capacity so to act, while, the
scope of the application and the manner of its making both taint
the application with invalidity. It is a nullity. In law, therefore,
there exists no application that the Council of Ministers may
refer to the Commission for an opinion and no application that
the Commission may properly receive. The suggestion is, accordingly,
respectfully made that the proper course is for the Council of
Ministers to take no action on the application. If, nonetheless,
this Council of Ministers should feel that it is necessary or
desirable that the Commission should express an opinion on the
validity of the application, then the reference to the Commission
should be precisely limited to this. It should not be a reference
to the Commission for an opinion on the substance of the application.
TRNC would welcome EC membership but only after settlement. 19.
Notwithstanding this the TRNC does not wish to create the impression
that it is opposed to the eventual membership of the European
Communities by a State of Cyprus restored to legality and stability
by a settlement freely negotiated between parties of equal standing.
When such a political settlement has been achieved, the Turkish
Cypriot community will be no less desirous than the Greek Cypriot
community to secure membership for the whole of Cyprus in a manner
that will ensure that the benefits of such membership, as well
as its burdens, are enjoyed and borne by both communities genuinely,
without discrimination between them.
Greek Cypriot admission would mean a second vote for Greece. 20.
In the meantime, it must be recognised that the effect of the
admission to the European Communities of the Greek Cypriot side
under the assumed title of "the Republic of Cyprus"
represented as it is today exclusively by the Greek Cypriot element
in the island would in effect, be to give to Greece a second vote
in all the deliberations of the Communities. There is no room
for the pretence that, left to itself, the Greek Cypriot community,
irrevocably committed in spirit as it has always been to union
with Greece, would act within the organs of the European Community
as anything other than a proxy of Greece. The only way to ensure
that Cyprus acts as a fully independent member of the European
Communities is to insist that membership should not be given to
it until there is reasonable certainty that its foreign and economic
policy will not be subservient to the interests of any neighbour.
That can only be assured by the establishment within Cyprus of
a system of government reflecting the existence of the two communities,
each possessing the capacity to prevent the exploitation of the
country's position for the sole or disproportionate benefit of
the other.
Application violates most recent UN Security Council resolution.
21. In its most recent resolution on Cyprus, of 12 March 1990
(649 (1990)), the UN Security Council called on "the parties
concerned to refrain from any action that could aggravate the
situation." In the specialised vocabulary that has developed
in this context the words "the parties" means not only
the two Cypriot communities but the interested governments, including,
with special reference to the present context, Greece. The present
move clearly aggravates the situation by destroying the equality
of status between the two communities that is the essential foundation
for the continuance of negotiations on the wider question.
Membership can only grow out of settlement. Not vice versa.
22. It must be realised that the entry into the European Communities
of a uniquely Greek Cypriot state cannot contribute to the resolution
of the differences between the two communities. Participation
in the European Communities can only grow out of the creation
of a new Republic of Cyprus that fully reflects the proper status
and role of both communities.